Stephen Dooley
This paper is based on 2 articles published in the "Computers and Law" magazine earlier this year. The paper deals with only 2 of the topics which may arise when the Internet is employed. Regular users of online services will have to consider what policies they should adopt with regard to their employees' use of the Internet for a whole range of issues, and not merely those described below.
Defamation has been elevated to the status of a spectator sport on the information superhighway, with entire bulletin boards being devoted to flaming (as this activity is known). The law of defamation is complicated, with procedural differences between actions for libel and for slander and defences which vary according to whether a defendant is a publisher of the defamation or a distributor of it. To date it is uncertain what position the courts will take in an action brought in Britain for defamatory remarks made over the Internet. Ironically it was an employee of CERN, the organisation largely responsible for the birth of the information superhighway in Europe, who came nearest to resolving this question when a former physicist at the German Electron Syncroton Laboratory claimed that remarks sent out over UseNet by that employee were defamatory. The matter was, however, settled out of court.
One assumption is made in this paper: that defamatory material appearing on the Internet amounts to libel rather than slander. Slander is a defamatory remark which is transitory in nature, whilst libel has an enduring quality. Even though a message on a bulletin board may be in existence for only a short period of time, this is no more transitory than writing a remark on paper and then shredding it. Gestures and words have no continuing existence: e-mail does1.
Cubby Inc v CompuServe Inc was an early case involving an online service provider being sued for libel. CompuServe provided a bulletin board focusing on the journalism industry and the board was monitored by Cameron Communications Inc (CCI), an independent company, whose role was to "manage, review, create, delete, edit and otherwise control the contents" of the bulletin board in accordance with standards set by CompuServe. One of the newsletters on the bulletin board was Rumourville which was run by a third defendant under a contract with CCI. CompuServe did not review Rumourville's contents before it was uploaded into CompuServe's server where it was immediately accessible by subscribers.
In 1990 the plaintiffs developed a news database which would compete with Rumourville. On various occasions in April 1990 Rumourville allegedly published defamatory remarks about this database and about the plaintiffs, who then sued CompuServe, CCI and the publishers of Rumourville. CompuServe claimed that it was a distributor of material rather than a publisher and could not be held responsible for any libel as it did not know, nor did it have reason to know, of the statements made on the Rumourville bulletin board. The court emphasised the instantaneous availability of the material to the subscribers to a bulletin board. The court concluded that CompuServe did not know, and had no reason to know, of the allegedly defamatory statements and that it was inappropriate to expect CompuServe to know of the statements. CompuServe were held not to be liable for any defamation which might have occurred.
That case was followed in 1992 by a similar case, Auvil v CBS "60 Minutes". In this case the producers of the chemical Alar, which is sprayed on apples to improve the fruit's appearance and storage life, sued CBS and three of its affiliates over a program which alleged that Alar broke down to produce a carcinogenic substance. It was undisputed that, as a matter of fact, the affiliates had exercised no editorial control over the broadcast. They did, however, have the power to do so, and had exercised those powers on previous occasions.
The court refused to accept the idea that having the power and the technical ability to edit material imposed a duty to do so. The Court held that if this obligation were imposed this would "force the creation of full time editorial boards at local stations throughout the country which possess sufficient knowledge, legal acumen and access to experts to continually monitor transmissions and exercise on the spot discretionary calls or face $75 million lawsuits at every turn". It was decided that the affiliates did republish the alleged libellous statement but that, in the absence of fault, there was no liability. The court held that to impose a duty to inspect was positively to be avoided. Only where an affiliate knew, or might reasonably be expected to know, that a programme contained defamatory material would liability arise.
This decision was consistent with CompuServe and it appeared that network providers and online service suppliers could view themselves as unlikely to be found liable for defamatory material posted on their bulletin boards about which they did not specifically know and which they had no reason to suspect might be on their systems.
This position was seriously undermined by the decision in Stratton Oakmont Inc -v- Prodigy Services Company. Derogatory comments which included accusations that the plaintiff company was guilty of fraud were posted on one of Prodigy's bulletin boards, "Money Talk", by an unknown person.
Stratton Oakmont sought, and obtained, partial judgement against Prodigy.
The court took care to emphasise that Prodigy held itself out to be a family oriented network and had marketed itself on the basis that it controlled the contents of its board. In addition, Prodigy used screening software to check all proposed bulletin board postings for offensive language and employed "Board Leaders" who could delete messages which were seen as infringing Prodigy's guidelines for board use. Prodigy argued that its Board Leaders had the ability to remove messages, but that they did not invariably do so, nor could they be expected to do so, given the 60,000 messages a day posted on Prodigy's board.
The court distinguished Cubby on the grounds that Prodigy held itself out to the public as controlling the content of the bulletin board and employed technology and manpower to achieve this. The exercise of such control, even if not total, was sufficient to make Prodigy a publisher of libel, rather than a distributor as CompuServe had been. The Court also distinguished Cubby on the grounds that Prodigy had virtually created an editorial staff with the ability continually to monitor transmissions and edit them. The court stated that it was in full agreement with Cubby and Auvil, but that Prodigy's policies meant that it had to be viewed, uniquely, as a publisher on the Internet rather than as a distributor of information.
This decision was greeted with consternation by service providers and is currently under appeal. One result has been that a number of service providers have been advised that they should take no steps to monitor the messages put out over their networks and that they should exercise no editorial function. This advice cannot be desirable. The notion of freedom of speech has always been subject to restrictions to preserve the rights of others to live peaceably and without being given unwarranted hurt or offence. Even if, currently, users of the Internet are thought to hold themselves open to receive certain types of communications, this presumption will fade as more and more people connect to the system.
The Prodigy case is not easily distinguishable from Auvil. In both cases the defendant companies could, in theory, exercise editorial control over material which they transmitted, and both had exercised that control in the past. In both cases, the sheer volume of information meant that it was not possible to vet all the material which was transmitted. It is also important to note that, whilst Prodigy's screening software deleted messages containing certain key "obscene" words, the editorial function of the "Board Leader" only operated once the message was on the bulletin board, ie. once it had already been published.
Whilst it is true that Prodigy held itself out, specifically, as a network which did vet, to a degree, the use of its bulletin boards, it does seem to have been in a no-win situation for some time. Prodigy came under fire in 1991 for not weeding out anti-semitic messages and then took the line that the best way of dealing with such attacks was to monitor its network. The next barrage came from those subscribers who objected to what they saw as the level of censorship imposed on them by Prodigy. Even the court in the Prodigy case savaged Prodigy for its automatic scanning and use of Board Leaders which the court said "may have a chilling effect on freedom of communication in Cyberspace, and it appears that this chilling effect is exactly what PRODIGY wants, but for the legal liability that attaches to such censorship".
It does not seem sensible to encourage on-line service providers to abrogate responsibility for messages on their bulletin boards and the Prodigy decision, if upheld, will encourage the sort of reckless behaviour for which certain bulletin board operators have been justly pilloried. Perhaps the last word on Prodigy should go to Bill Schneck, writing on a bulletin board in 1991 (some time before the case):
"The PRODIGY service (gotta respect those trademarks!) holds itself out as a publisher, and thus controls its content, but nowhere does it claim to review every message before it appears on a bulletin board. Thus there is a question of whether Prodigy can be liable for something it doesn't know about. Put another way, Prodigy claims the right to control the content of its bulletin board...., but does not assume an obligation to monitor them. This is the same standard that applies to any [systems operator], just more pro-actively applied. - Bill Schneck (who happens to be Counsel for Prodigy Services Company, but is off-duty right now)."
It has been reported that the trial judge in the Prodigy case was asked by both parties to reverse his decision after they had reached a settlement and following intense lobbying by the Internet community. The judge refused in a fairly rude fashion.
The principal statute in this area is the Defamation Act 1952 which sought to update the law relating to libel and slander. Amongst its provisions it states that broadcasting by radio is to be treated as publication in permanent form and hence libel. This arguably arose from a policy decision that slander is to be defined as an individual action with a small audience whilst a radio broadcast reaches a far wider audience than any individual could speak to personally. This is not entirely consistent with the conventional distinction between libel and slander, but even with this criteria it would be logical to view transmission on the Internet as publication, and thus libel since the audience reached is, potentially, wider than that of any radio station.
It is a little surprising that there have been very few English cases concerning defamation on the Internet given that English law, although coming from the same common law roots as the US system, has developed far fewer exceptions and defences to libel than the US. However, awards of damages do tend to be comparatively restrained in England. In the US there are exceptions to the normal rules for libel for comments made about public figures which are not proved to have been made maliciously. Such comments are held to come under the aegis of the First Amendment to the US Constitution, protecting freedom of speech. This protection extends, basically, to comments made about public figures and not to private individuals defamed, either in public or in private. The UK, notably, has no such right to free speech and it is normally the famous who are most able and willing to bring actions to protect their reputation. Likewise a statement of opinion is regarded as protected speech in the US unless it implies a statement of fact, whilst the defence of fair comment in England is hedged with strictly interpreted criteria, first amongst which is that the comment may only be on a matter of public interest.
In the UK there is neither legal aid nor the option of contingency fees to enable the ordinary citizen to protect his name. In the US contingency fees are not uncommon and it is frequently the individual (or a corporation) who will litigate for libel rather than a public figure. In the UK one can imagine a Dan Quayle figure having brought actions against virtually every publication reporting on his activities, but in the US such comments are seen as going with the job.
Another difference which would seem to make England a potentially popular forum for bringing libel actions as compared to the US is that in various US states damages will be limited to actual monetary damage unless malice is shown and actual monetary loss will be minimal in most cases.
As stated above the liability of online service providers has not been raised as an issue in England, but there has been considerable discussion in legal journals as to whether they should be viewed as publishers of material on bulletin boards, in which case they might be found liable for defamation without any fault, or as innocent disseminators of the material, in much the same way as a street vendor is an innocent disseminator of the material in the newspapers which he sells. The position of an innocent disseminator is equivalent to that of a distributor in the US and innocent dissemination of defamatory material is an absolute defence to an action for libel.
Various online service providers have been advised to adopt a hands-off approach to policing their systems to ensure that they are viewed as a Cubby-style distributor or innocent disseminator rather than as a Prodigy-style publisher of information. This laissez-faire attitude, if adopted, can only hinder the expansion of the information superhighway and may well lead to liability for defamation rather than avoiding it.
The defence of innocent dissemination has three elements when applied to a network operator or, indeed anyone providing access to the Internet:
1. the operator did not know that the network/bulletin board contained the libel complained of;
2. the operator did not know that material on the network or bulletin board was of a nature likely to contain libellous material; and
3. that the operator's lack of knowledge of 1 and 2 above is not due to any negligence on the operator's part.
If an operator becomes aware that a bulletin board is likely to contain defamatory material it will not be able to use this defence. It was because of this that WH Smith stopped stocking Scallywag after being threatened with a libel action relating to material in that magazine. If an operator closes its eyes as to the nature of the material on its bulletin boards or networks, it does not seem likely that it will be able to escape liability. An operator which states that it does not vet material posted on its network will find it difficult to show that it was unaware of defamatory material being posted without any negligence on its part. Even if Prodigy is upheld in the United States it should not be assumed that exactly the same principles apply in England. A service provider will be in a much better position if it clearly reserves the right to edit material which is offensive, obscene or defamatory, whilst equally clearly stating that its resources are such that it is impossible to view anything but a tiny fraction of messages posted, and that it is the individual user's responsibility to ensure that messages do not infringe the provider's use guidelines. (Obviously the system provider will have to have an appropriate set of the guidelines.) Had Prodigy not expressly taken on responsibility for messages appearing on its bulletin boards then the case might well have been decided differently. It should be borne in mind that these criteria apply not merely to a provider such as Pipex or Demon, but also firms which provide access to the Internet for their employees, but such firms are unlikely to succeed with an argument that they are merely operators in a computer system.
The sensible solution lies between the two extremes of claiming to vet all material posted and refusing to look at any of it. The adoption of either extreme as a policy is likely to result in liability for any defamatory material posted on a provider's system. Instead companies need to formulate clear policies governing staff usage of the Internet and online services.
In 1996 the Defamation Act was passed. This Act reformed, amongst other areas, the defence of innocent dissemination. The reforms were made in the light of advances in technology since the defence was first established. Section 1(1) deals with this defence and states that it will be "a defence if [a person] shows that - (a) he was not the author, editor or publisher of the statement complained of, (b) he took reasonable care in relation to its publication, and (c) he did not know and had no reason to believe, that what he did caused or contributed to the publication of a defamatory statement." The Act states that those merely processing, making copies or distributing any electronic medium on which the statement is stored are not regarded as primarily responsible for the publication of a defamatory statement. Nor, for that matter is anyone who only operates the equipment by means of which such a statement is retrieved, copied or distributed.
The Act goes on to state that, in determining whether reasonable care has been exercised, the courts are to pay attention to, amongst other things, the defendant's responsibility for the content of the statement or the decision to publish it. Obviously this will be minimal for the average service provider, but will be greater for an employer whose employee has sent out a potentially defamatory remark.
This defence is not intended to protect those who have cause to know that they are publishing defamatory material and this group will include those who refuse to adopt a sensible attitude to policing their networks or their connections to the Internet. It is significant that this section was drafted with the operation of computer networks specifically in mind. Clearly no blanket immunity is intended for service providers, nor would one be appropriate. The Act merely seeks to make clear the path which the Court would have been likely to take anyway through the application of current legal principles. The Act encourages sensible use by individuals and sensible policing by service providers, but without imposing an obligation to censor or conferring a right to do nothing. The Act also requires that the service provider shows that it was not responsible for the libel, had no knowledge and was not negligent. This is the right approach since the burden of proof is put on the party which is able to show the degree of care which was actually taken.
The Act adopts the position that the transmission of a defamatory statement over a computer network amounts to libel. This agrees with the view expressed at the beginning of this article and with the US case law.
There is, however, an ambiguity in the Act since the defence of innocent dissemination is open only to a service provider which only processes the information on its network or which operates the equipment by which information is transmitted. This implies that anyone checking the contents of messages posted on their network will not be able to use the defence of innocent dissemination. However, the Act requires that the innocent disseminator must take all reasonable care and this implies a duty to exercise some degree of control which, in turn, leads to a circular situation where liability arises regardless of the service provider's actions.
One area which has been left open by the Act is clarification on where the publication of the libellous material takes place. The current position under English law is that publication occurs in the place of communication rather than creation; and a libellous e-mail message received in Swindon from a source in Stockholm will be subject to English libel laws. The same message may also have been received in St Petersburg, Split and Sarajevo and actions for libel could be brought in all the appropriate countries.
A service provider should take steps to ensure that its users know and have easy access to its conditions of use. The obvious way of doing this is to make them available on the system being used. In addition it should clearly reserve the right to intercept and edit messages and to cut off a user if necessary, while making it equally clear that it is impossible to view every message sent on a system. Likewise an employer connected to an online service provider should draft appropriate guidelines for its employees.
The Internet does not recognise international boundaries and, although a libellous message may be located on a bulletin board in one particular country it may, conceivably, be viewed in every country in the world. This is a potentially devastating risk for any company or individual to run given the potentially vast numbers of actions which may arise from one message and potential defendants will have to consider what position they should take.
Whether the English courts will enforce the judgement of a foreign court is very different from whether they will recognise that judgement. Generally it is enforcement which is the more important.
Very loosely the English courts will recognise the judgement of a competent foreign court which has jurisdiction according to English law and whose judgement is final and not obtained in a fashion repugnant to the English legal system. If the defendant in an action is domiciled in an EC state according to the law of that state and not domiciled in the UK then that state is the governing jurisdiction for any action. However, a defendant need not be sued only in his place of domicile if certain conditions laid down by the 1968 Brussels Convention are satisfied: under the Convention a libelled party may sue in any contracting state where they have suffered harm. Once again the plaintiff is afforded freedom to choose the most advantageous forum of law. If, on the other hand, the defendant is not domiciled within the EC the appropriate jurisdiction would, according to common law principles, be the defendant's country of residence, but, again, there are exceptions this time found in the Rules of the Supreme Court, which may allow an action to be brought in England. The most significant of these exceptions is that the English courts may accept jurisdiction where damage has arisen within England. Whilst the courts will willingly recognise foreign jurisdiction and judgements it is clear that England will be a relatively easy forum of law to choose should it be seen as desirable.
The English courts will enforce the judgement of a foreign court if the defendant:
- is a subject of the country in which judgement has been obtained;
- was resident in the foreign country when the action began;
- selected the forum as plaintiff and was subsequently sued in that jurisdiction in a counterclaim;
- voluntarily appeared in that jurisdiction; or
- has contracted to submit himself to the jurisdiction of that foreign court.
As a general rule an English defendant will not have the judgement of a foreign court enforced against him if that defendant has not contracted to accept that country's judgement, been a resident of that country or voluntarily appeared at those proceedings. Many defendants have, in the past, chosen to ignore foreign judgements. This is inadvisable, however, where the defendant has assets in the foreign country concerned against which the court order may be enforced.
The above does not apply to EC countries where enforcement is mutual between member states, nor does it apply to most Commonwealth countries which benefit from the Administration of Justice Act 1920 allowing registration of an Order of that country's courts with the High Court if the High Court deems it just and convenient. There is also reciprocal enforcement of court orders obtained in Austria, Canada, Israel, Norway, Pakistan, Suriname, Guernsey, Jersey, the Isle of Man, India, Australian Capital Territory and Tonga, but there is an implication in the Act governing enforcement orders made in those countries that if the defendant did not make a submission to the foreign court the English courts will not permit registration.
In many cases an English defendant will be wise not to submit to the jurisdiction of a foreign court and, likewise, a plaintiff faced with this situation should certainly consider bringing any action within England.
"Adult" bulletin boards are far and away the most frequently used on the Internet. The Internet itself is a fairly libertarian community, but is also one where access to these bulletin boards cannot easily be restricted. Indeed teenagers, as a group, are far more able to manipulate the Internet than their parents, and concern over the ease with which children can gain access to hard-core pornography has led to proposals for legislation to deal with the problem in both the United Kingdom and the United States. The problem has also been made more acute by concern over cases reported in the newspapers such as that of the Whitehall bureaucrats who came to work one morning to discover that someone had dumped hard-core pornography onto their system, and an unrelated episode where similar material was found to be coming from a university department. In neither case was the responsible party discovered. There has also been a case earlier this year where two men were charged, with disseminating child pornography over the Internet; they used computers at a university to transmit the images. On 26 July of this year, 9 men were arrested in the UK and hundreds of photographs depicting children in sexually explicit situations were seized as part of an international operation designed to clamp down on the use of the Internet by pornographers.
The U.S. approach to the problem has had to be very different from that in the U K as obscenity in the U.S. focuses on: (a) whether the material is offensive to the average person applying community standards; (b) whether it is, depicts or describes, in a patently offensive fashion, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether, taken as a whole, the material lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. This means that those providing network services in and to the U.S. have had to pay regard to the standards of obscenity defined in every state covered by their system.
If a person transmits obscene material through a network so that obscene material is transported across state lines then they may be liable to prosecution under Federal Law. This is a more wide-reaching provision than may appear as the nature of the Internet is such that a user in Arkansas might receive obscene material from a bulletin board also in Arkansas, but the material may well have followed a network path taking it through, say, North Carolina in which case there has been interstate transportation of obscene material and Federal Law will apply.
In the U.S., the mere possession of obscene material in one's own home is not an offence. Attempting to interfere in what a person reads or watches in the privacy of their own home, no matter how reprehensible, is regarded as an infringement of the First Amendment. That said, the privileges attached to actions within one's own home are questionable when they involve connecting a home computer to a network which operates in the outside world. At the time of writing legislation designed to deal with this issue and to regulate the supply and transmission of obscene material on the Internet is being implemented. The intention seems to be to preserve the individual's rights within their own home, but the movement of obscene material will be controlled by Federal law.
Other U.S. legislation with a role to play in regulating the Internet also exists. Federal Law prohibits the use of a telephone to make an interstate or foreign communication which is obscene, lewd, lascivious or indecent, or to make a call, whether or not conversation ensues, without disclosing the caller's identity and with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass any person at the called number. Federal Law also punishes the knowing transport, distribution or receipt of material showing minors in sexually explicit conduct. This material need not be obscene to fall foul of the law.
One factor which complicates matters further is that the test of whether material is obscene turns on the average person applying the standards of his community. Material sent to different states might be subject to widely different community standards and certain bulletin boards, themselves, are developing community characteristics. The defamation case involving the bulletin board operator, Prodigy, may well have turned on the "family channel" reputation which Prodigy had tried to foster.
In the United Kingdom the definition of obscenity does not depend on community standards, but on the type of person who may have access to the material and whether they are likely to be depraved and corrupted by the material. Unlike conventional "hard" pornography, material on the Internet is obtainable in relatively uncontrolled circumstances, and the definition of what is likely to deprave and corrupt those likely to have access to the Internet will be accordingly low.
The Obscene Publications Act was recently amended so that publication is now defined to include the transmission of electronically stored data which, on resolution into user viewable form, is obscene. The definition of publication continues to cover any distribution, circulation, sale, giving, lending, or playing of an obscene article. The effect of this amendment is that the sender of obscene material is not the only party who runs the risk of prosecution: the organisation providing facilities allowing access to the Internet, such as a computer centre, a university, or an employer may be liable, together with the network operator.
It is a defence to any prosecution to show that the person charged did not examine the obscene material, and that they had no reasonable cause to suspect that its publication would lead to liability. Because of the twofold nature of this defence, if a provider of facilities or a network operator becomes aware that obscene material is being put onto the Internet via their system they cannot ignore the problem. If a provider of facilities or a network operator becomes aware that there is a likelihood that their facilities or system are being used to distribute obscene material, and chooses to do nothing, they will be opening themselves up to the risk of prosecution.
The Protection of Children Act 1978 (the 1978 Act) and the corresponding legislation applying to Scotland and Northern Ireland has also been amended. The amended 1978 Act makes it an offence to take, make, permit to be taken, distribute, show, possess intending to distribute or show, or publish any indecent photograph or indecent pseudo-photograph of a child. A pseudo-photograph means any image which can be resolved into an image which appears to be a photograph and, if the image appears to show a child, then the image is to be treated as if that of a child. As a result there is no need for the image to have been based on a child: an indecent image which is not based on any living subject is now covered by the 1978 Act.
A person or company charged under the 1978 Act with distributing, showing, or possessing intending to show or distribute, has two potential defences, the first being that the person or company charged did not see the image and that they had no knowledge or suspicion that the image was indecent, and the second that there was a legitimate reason for possessing or distributing the image e.g. for academic research.
The 1978 Act makes no reference to obscenity; instead the 1978 Act uses the undefined term "indecent". Where the portrayal and protection of children is involved the level of protection required must be a high one and, in keeping with this policy, an image may be indecent without being obscene. An article is obscene if it offends the highest standards of propriety, but will be indecent if it offends the lower end of that standard. Given that our standards of what is proper tend to be extremely high where children are involved, an image involving an adult which might be seen as merely risqué would quickly become indecent were a child or childlike image to be similarly portrayed. A picture of a naked child in a bath seems to be indecent according to recent newspaper stories.
It is also an offence to possess an indecent image of a child or indecent child-like image. The defences available are the same as those under the Protection of Children Act as described above and, additionally, that the image was not requested and was not kept for an unreasonable length of time after receipt.
The Telecommunications Act also has a role to play in the regulation of potentially obscene material on the Internet. Under this Act it is an offence to use deliberately a public telecommunication system to send offensive, threatening or obscene material. There have already been cases in the U.S covering obscene and threatening messages sent by e-mail but, to the best of the author's knowledge, such a case has not yet arisen in the UK. However, it can only be a matter of time before prosecutions are brought although not all Internet service providers use public telecommunications systems.
The final statute which deals with obscene material in the context of the Internet is the Indecent Displays Act 1981. This makes it an offence to display indecent material in public. There is no doubt that the open nature of the Internet makes it a public arena. An article or item is not on public display when it may be viewed only on the payment of a fee. This may mean that certain "adult" bulletin boards will not be subject to this Act if they require subscription fees, but much of the material on the Internet is available without the payment of a specific fee and those carrying or distributing such material are at risk of prosecution.
The range of statutes currently in force should be adequate to police the Internet. The risk is not so much that the law cannot cope with the Internet, but that the situations, whilst not novel, are in a different context from those in which they have previously been encountered. The law has always been capable of extending itself without its wholesale re-invention, which is what some expect and demand. On a practical level, those providing facilities and those running networks will have to consider their potential liabilities for the transmission of pornography under the statutes mentioned above. At the very least, sensible monitoring procedures and training of users in both practice and procedure will have to be put in place.
Footnotes
1. This view is disputed by some, see B Sanford, Libel & Privacy (2 ed. 1991), but the general view favours online defamation as being libel.
Stephen Dooley
Sidley &Austin
May 1997